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Extensive efforts have been made in the modern period to suppress the possession and use of both 
chemical and nuclear weapons. However, progress towards the abolition of these two types of 
weapons presents a rather sharp contrast, as this case study shows. In this article the conventional 
prohibitions on the possession and use of these weapons are outlined, including the recent Treaty on 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons of 2017. This Treaty prohibits the possession and use of nuclear 
weapons but it has not been (and likely will not be) ratified by any of the States that possess nuclear 
weapons. There is a further, and consequent, contrast between the two kinds of weapons in terms of 
whether a customary prohibition on the possession and use of chemical and/or nuclear weapons 
exists; this is also examined. Ultimately, there are lessons to be learned in terms of whether 
international law can change unless those most concerned, in this case the States that possess 
chemical or nuclear weapons, want it to change.  
The Short Twentieth Century ended in problems, for which nobody had, or even claimed to have, 
solutions. As the citizens of the fin-de-siècle tapped their way through the global fog that surrounded 
them, into the third millennium, all they knew was that an era of history had ended. They knew very little 
else. Thus, for the first time in two centuries, the world of the 1990s entirely lacked any system or 
structure.1 
I INTRODUCTION  
The problem of peaceful change in international law has been a fixture on the agenda throughout 
the modern period. The League of Nations Covenant gave functions both to the Council (Article 15) 
and the Assembly (Article 19); these were subsumed in general terms in relation both to the Security 
Council and the General Assembly under the United Nations Charter. But the core problem is that, 
  
*  Judge, International Court of Justice. Thanks to my associate, Rose Cameron, for her considerable assistance 
with this article. Views expressed are mine alone. 
1  Eric Hobsbawm The Age of Extremes 1914–1991 (Michael Joseph, London, 1991) at 558–559. 
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while developments occur and even proliferate, the techniques of change are rudimentary: the giving 
of consent through treaty-making, and the development of customary international law through 
practices of claim and counter-claim, acceptance and acquiescence – the processes of giving, 
withholding and withdrawing of consent. The only constituted substantive values in the international 
system are those that relate to who gives consent, how and to what effect. The rest is all rights and 
obligations (many of them defeasible, precarious or terminable) deriving from these processes. 
One may contrast the mechanisms for reform commonly found in national legal systems. In well-
governed states, these are constitutional amendment, legislation based on forms of popular 
representation, executive action under the law, and the adjustment of rights and rules through 
adjudication. With the exception of the first, there are simulacra of these at the international level. 
Constitutional amendment is hardly relevant: the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations is 
the doctrine of state sovereignty,2 and while that can be reinforced, modulated or undermined, no state 
is going to agree to amend it. If the United Nations Charter has been analogised to a form of 
government and thus, in a sense, to a constitution, the fate of 25 years of discussion of Charter reform 
reveals little or no progress. Multilateral treaties equate to legislation; concluding them these days 
takes an enormous effort, but it is as nothing compared with the task of amendment. The best that can 
usually be done is to conclude a new treaty on the subject of the old and rely upon the open-textured 
rules in arts 41 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to work out the operative 
consequences.3 Executive action is the normal mode of state action, but whether it takes place under 
the law depends on the available disciplines at national and (perhaps less often) international level. 
Adjustment through adjudication depends on the good sense of the adjudicator, but if it is available it 
is usually interstitial in effect. 
When one thinks of alternatives, they seem sub-optimal. To take as an example the Paris 
Agreement (which remarkably lacks any other title, as if there have been no other Paris agreements), 
this is essentially a set of procedural arrangements for setting unilaterally-determined targets in the 
matter of carbon emissions in order (it is hoped) to alleviate climate change.4 The extent of 
commitment is unclear, and deliberately so.  
Can it be true that our international arrangements "entirely lack any system or structure"?5 Can 
anything but interstitial change be institutionally impossible in time of peace? Can these two things 
  
2  Compare James Crawford Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) at 447 ("the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations"). 
3  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980). 
4  Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 55 ILM 743 (opened 
for signature 22 April 2016, entered into force 4 November 2016). 
5  Hobsbawm, above n 1, at 559. 
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be simultaneously true? Perhaps we are condemned to trying to rearrange the furniture while sitting 
on it. 
I have discussed the dilemmas of change in international law in general terms elsewhere.6 But to 
talk in general terms risks avoiding the real issue, which is how, given the principle of consent and its 
particular manifestation in this field, the persistent objector principle,7 international law can change 
unless those most concerned, especially the most powerful, want it to change.  
It is proposed to take here by way of a case study the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, 
specifically chemical8 and nuclear weapons. These share two features which are relevant to our theme. 
First, the case for complete elimination of these weapons is overwhelming. As to chemical weapons 
(leaving aside marginal and definitional issues such as riot control agents) no-one now defends their 
use. As to nuclear weapons, we have got accustomed to living under the shadow of deterrence – but 
the prospect of their actual use has again been raised in the context of North Korea and possible 
responses to its acquisition and testing of nuclear devices. The actual use of a nuclear weapon on any 
group or population would surely trigger a wave of revulsion and would reflect terribly on an 
international system that allowed it to happen. Secondly, extensive efforts have been made in the 
modern period to suppress the possession and use of these weapons, whether by states or non-state 
entities, so there is a full record of the ways in which this has been done or attempted. Yet the results 
so far are rather different, and the differences are telling.  
  
6  James Crawford Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2014) 
at chs IV and VIII.  
7  Now affirmed by the International Law Commission Third report on identification of customary international 
law UN Doc A/CN.4/682 (27 March 2015) at 59. See also International Law Commission Fourth report on 
identification of customary international law UN Doc A/CN.4/695 (8 March 2016) at 10. 
8  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction 1974 UNTS 45 (opened for signature 3 September 1992, entered into force 29 April 
1997) [CWC]. Article II(1) defines chemical weapons widely as meaning "toxic chemicals and their 
precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and 
quantities are consistent with such purposes" as well as munitions specifically designed to cause death or  
other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals and any equipment specifically designed for 
use directly in connection with the employment of those munitions. This definition, which does not depend 
on the means of dispersal, is adopted by Stuart Casey-Maslen The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2013 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2014) at 297. 
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II ATTEMPTS TO OUTLAW CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
Attempts to outlaw chemical weapons have a long history.9 The Brussels Declaration of 1874 
declared that the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" was "especially forbidden"10 and the Hague 
Regulations of 1899 and 1907 prohibited their use during hostilities.11 The Geneva Protocol of 1925 
prohibited the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials 
or devices" and "bacteriological methods of warfare" but did not prohibit their development, 
production or stockpiling.12 The Biological Weapons Convention of 197213 prohibited the retention 
or production of biological agents or toxins and of the means of delivering such agents during armed 
conflict.14 While the Biological Weapons Convention does not prohibit the use or possession of 
chemical weapons, States Parties to the Convention affirmed "the recognised objective of effective 
prohibition of chemical weapons" and undertook to "continue negotiations in good faith with a view 
to reaching early agreement on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and 
stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction".15 The Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (CWC) was the result of 
these efforts. 
The text of the CWC was drafted by the Conference on Disarmament and approved by the General 
Assembly on 30 November 1992.16 It entered into force on 29 April 1997 and now has 193 parties, 
Palestine having acceded to the Convention on 17 May 2018. Among United Nations Member States, 
Israel has signed but not ratified; Egypt, North Korea and South Sudan have neither signed nor 
  
9  Jefferson identifies expressions of a prohibition on chemical weapons as early as 500BC in ancient Hindu 
Laws: Catherine Jefferson "Origins of the norm against chemical weapons" (2014) 90 International Affairs 
647. Oeter describes the prohibition against poison as "probably the most ancient prohibition of a means of 
combat in international law": Stefan Oeter "Methods and Means of Combat" in Dieter Fleck (ed) The 
Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013) 115. 
10  William H Boothby Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 
at 104.  
11  Hague Regulations of 1899, art 23(a) prohibits "poison or poisoned arms". Hague Regulations of 1907, art 
23(a) prohibits "poison or poisoned weapons". 
12  Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare (signed 17 June 1925, entered into force 8 February 1928). 
13  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 1015 UNTS 163 (opened for signature 10 April 
1972, entered into force 26 March 1975). 
14  Article I.  
15  Article IX. 
16  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on Their Destruction GA Res 47/39 (1992) at [1].  
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ratified. The CWC preserves obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological 
Weapons Convention of 1972.17 
The CWC prohibits the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances,18 as well as the 
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and retention of chemical weapons and military 
preparations for their use.19 It further prohibits the transfer of chemical weapons and the provision of 
assistance to anyone to engage in prohibited activity.20 It prohibits the use of riot control agents as a 
method of warfare.21  
The CWC also contains provisions relating to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. In 
particular, States Parties undertake never under any circumstances to assist, encourage or induce 
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the Convention.22 Assistance can include material, 
intellectual or financial support.23 Furthermore, States Parties agree to adopt the necessary measures 
to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, 
retained, transferred, or used within their territory or in any other place under their jurisdiction or 
control for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, and to that end they agree to submit to the 
verification measures set out in Convention.24 Along with disarmament, the non-proliferation of 
chemical weapons is a central feature of the CWC and its obligations apply equally to all Parties. In 
presenting the draft Convention to the Conference on Disarmament in 1992, the Chairman of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons noted that the total ban on chemical weapons was acceptable 
to states because the obligations emanating from the Convention "enhanced the security of all and … 
were absolutely non-discriminatory".25  
Parties to the CWC must make detailed declarations in relation to their past and present ownership, 
possession or control of chemical weapons and their chemical weapons production facilities.26 Each 
  
17  CWC, above n 8, art XIII. 
18  Article I(1)(b). Article I is entitled "General Obligations". 
19  Article I(1)(a) and (c). 
20  Article I(1)(a) and (d). 
21  Article I(5). 
22  Article I(1)(d). 
23  Walter Krutzch, Eric Myjer and Ralf Trapp (eds) The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 67. 
24  CWC, above n 8, art VI(2). 
25  See Report of the Conference on Disarmament UN Doc A/47/27 (1992) at 37–38. 
26  CWC, above n 8, art III and Verification Annex, pt IV(A) at [1]–[6]. These declarations must include whether 
the State Party owns, possesses or controls chemical weapons, the location and quantity of the weapons and 
the "general plan" for the destruction of the weapons. 
452 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons it owns, possesses or controls, as well as any 
chemical weapons it has abandoned on another state's territory, and further undertakes to destroy any 
chemical weapons production facilities it owns, possesses or controls.27  
The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to 
ensure the implementation of the CWC and to oversee verification.28 The verification regime is set 
out in the Annex on Implementation and Verification, which forms an integral part of the CWC.29 As 
part of the strict regime, States Parties are subject to inspections on their territory for verification of 
compliance including the validity of the initial declaration, of storage facilities and of chemical 
weapons destruction facilities.30 "Challenge inspections" can be conducted by teams designated by 
the Director-General of the OPCW at the request of another Party that suspects non-compliance.31 
The CWC is not subject to reservations and its Annexes are not subject to reservations 
incompatible with its object and purpose.32 A Party wishing to withdraw may do so if it decides that 
"extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter" of the CWC have jeopardized its "supreme 
interests":33 90 days' notice is required.34 
III ATTEMPTS TO OUTLAW NUCLEAR WEAPONS35 
Attempts to outlaw nuclear weapons necessarily have a shorter history than attempts to outlaw 
chemical weapons because nuclear weapons were not developed until the 1940s.36 From the 1960s 
  
27  Article I(2)–(4). The Convention contains time limits for destruction, in relation to the date on which the 
Convention came into force for a particular State Party: see Verification Annex, pt IV(A) at [17]. 
28  Article VIII(1). 
29  Article XVII provides that the Annexes "form an integral part of this Convention. Any reference to this 
Convention includes the Annexes." 
30  See Verification Annex, pt IV(A) at [37]–[70]. 
31  The procedure for "challenge inspections" is set out in art IX(8). 
32  Article XXII. 
33  Article XVI(2).   
34  Article XVI(2). Notice must be given to all other States Parties, the Executive Council of the OPCW, the 
Depositary and the Security Council. 
35  Some of this material is taken from James Crawford and Phillipe Sands "Legal Aspects of a Nuclear Weapons 
Convention" in Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Background Papers 
(Australian Government Publishing Services, Canberra, 1996) 275, in revised form (1998) 6 AYIL 153, with 
appropriate updating: the lessons of that paper seem still to hold. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 at 249.  
36  The first nuclear weapons were developed by the United States between 1942 and 1945 as part of the 
Manhattan Project. By way of contrast poisoned weapons – predecessors of chemical weapons – have been 
used since "ancient times", for example in the form of poisoned arrows: Boothby, above n 10, at 103. 
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treaties have prohibited the explosion of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under 
water37 and have created nuclear weapon-free zones.38  
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (NPT) limited the horizontal 
proliferation of nuclear weapons by prohibiting nuclear-weapon States from transferring nuclear 
weapons to any recipient and from assisting any non-nuclear-weapon State in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons.39 The NPT also prohibited the manufacture of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-
weapons States.40 The NPT has 191 States Parties. All States Parties undertook to pursue negotiations 
in good faith on effective measures to achieve nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on "general and 
complete disarmament".41 The NPT defines "a nuclear weapon State" in a limited way as a state 
"which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967".42 Those 
States are China, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and France.  Four other States – 
India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – are known to have or suspected of having nuclear weapons.43 
This article uses "States that possess nuclear weapons" to denote these nine States. 
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty44 of 1996 prohibits the carrying out of any nuclear 
weapons test explosion, but has not yet come into force.45 Alongside these multilateral agreements, a 
  
37  Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 480 UNTS 43 
(signed 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963), art 1(a).  
38  There are five nuclear weapons-free zones: in Latin America (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
in Latin America 634 UNTS 326 (opened for signature 14 February 1967, entered into force 25 April 1969)); 
the South Pacific (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 1445 UNTS 177 (opened for signature 6 August 
1985, entered into force 11 December 1986)); Southeast Asia (Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
1981 UNTS 129 (opened for signature 15 December 1995, entered into force 28 March 1997)); Africa 
(African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 35 ILM 698 (opened for signature 11 April 1996, entered into force 15 
July 2009) [Treaty of Pelindaba]); and Central Asia (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia 
(opened for signature 8 September 2006, entered into force 21 March 2009)). Nuclear explosions are 
prohibited in the Antarctic pursuant to art V of The Antarctic Treaty 402 UNTS 71 (signed 1 December 1959, 
entered into force 23 June 1961). Article VII of the NPT preserved the right of any group of states to conclude 
regional treaties to "assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories". 
39  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 729 UNTS 161 (opened for signature 1 July 1968, 
entered into force 5 March 1970) [NPT], art 1.  
40  Article II.  
41  Article VI. 
42  Article IX(3) 
43  Shannon N Kile and Hans M Kristensen Trends in World Nuclear Forces (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 2017) at 1. 
44  Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 35 ILM 1439 (opened for signature 10 September 1996, not yet in 
force). 
45  Article I of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty prohibits any nuclear weapons test explosion. The 
Convention will not come into force until all of the States listed in its Annex 2 have ratified it (art XIV). 
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series of bilateral negotiations have taken place between the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
from 1991, between the United States and Russia.46 However, until 2017 there was no treaty 
prohibition on the possession and use of nuclear weapons in every circumstance.  
The text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted on 7 July 
2017 at the United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear 
Weapons, Leading Towards their Total Elimination.47 The General Assembly had convened the 
conference on the recommendation of an Open-ended Working Group tasked with addressing 
"concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain 
and maintain a world without nuclear weapons".48 One hundred and twenty-two countries voted in 
favour of the Treaty text, the Netherlands voted against it and Singapore abstained. None of the States 
that possess nuclear weapons participated in the Conference or the vote.49 The Treaty opened for 
signature on 20 September 2017 and was signed by 50 States on that date.50 It is not yet in force but 
will commence 90 days after 50 States have ratified it.51 The Treaty preserves obligations undertaken 
  
Annex 2 States are those that formally participated in the 1996 Conference on Disarmament and possessed 
nuclear reactors at that time. China, Egypt, the United States, Israel, Iran, India, North Korea and Pakistan are 
the Annex 2 States which have not yet ratified the Treaty. 
46  Two sets of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II) took place between 1969 and 1979 and resulted 
in agreements in which the two parties agreed to limit their arsenals of particular weapons, including 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These 
negotiations were followed by five further rounds of negotiating dubbed START (Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty) I, II and III; SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty); and the New START, which also 
involved attempts to agree on limitations of both States' arsenal of ICBM and SLBM warheads, amongst other 
weapons. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (entered into force 5 December 1994) [START I]; the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (3 January 1993, did not enter into force) [START II]; Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty (24 May 2002, entered into force 1 June 2003) [SORT]; and Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Russian Federation on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms 111-5 TIAS (signed 8 April 2010, entered into force 5 February 2011) [New START]. 
47  Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 729 UNTS 161 (opened for signature 20 September 2017, not 
yet in force) [TPNW]. 
48  The Open-ended Working Group was given its mandate pursuant to Taking forward multilateral nuclear 
disarmament negotiations GA Res 70/33 (2015) at [2]. See also in relation to the steps that preceded the 
adoption of the Treaty text United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs "TPNW" (24 July 2017) 
<www.un.org>.  
49  See UN "United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, 
Leading Towards their Total Elimination" <www.un.org>.  
50  United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs "List of Countries which Signed Treaty on the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons on Opening Day" (20 September 2017) <www.un.org>.  
51  TPNW, above n 47, art 15. So far 19 States have ratified the TPNW. 
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with regard to existing international agreements where those obligations are consistent with the 
Treaty.52 
The TPNW prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.53 It 
also prohibits under any circumstances the development, testing, production, manufacture, acquiring, 
possessing or stockpiling of nuclear weapons.54 Finally it prohibits the transfer and receipt of nuclear 
weapons, the provision of assistance to anyone to engage in activity prohibited by it, and the 
installation of nuclear weapons on any territory under a Party's control.55 It safeguards States Parties' 
"inalienable right" to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, although only by way of a 
preambular paragraph.56 
Each Party must make a detailed declaration within 30 days of the TPNW's entry into force for 
that state in relation to its past and current ownership, possession or control of nuclear weapons.57 
The TPNW provides for a verification regime but only in broad terms. Parties must designate a 
"competent international authority" to "negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-
weapons programmes".58 In the event the competent authority is not designated prior to the TPNW's 
entry into force for a State that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices (or did so at any time after 7 July 2017), the United Nations Secretary-General will convene 
an extraordinary meeting at which the decision will be made.59 Any Party that owns, possesses or 
controls nuclear weapons after 7 July 2017 must destroy them and coordinate the "irreversible 
elimination of its nuclear-weapons programme" with the competent international authority.60 All 
Parties, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons, must comply with their existing International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard obligations or conclude a comprehensive safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA if they do not already have one.61 
  
52  Article 18. 
53  Article 1(d). 
54  Article 1(a). 
55  Article 1(b)–(c) and (e)–(g). 
56  The NPT contains the same safeguard in its art IV. Article IV of the NPT also mandates cooperation between 
its States Parties in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
57  TPNW, above n 47, art 2. 
58  Article 4(6). 
59  Article 4(6). 
60  Article 4(1)–(2). 
61  See art 3(1) in relation to compliance with existing IAEA safeguards obligations by States with no nuclear 
weapons; art 3(2) in relation to new safeguards agreements between the IAEA and States with no nuclear 
weapons; and art 4 in relation to States which possess nuclear weapons after 7 July 2017. 
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The TPNW is not subject to reservations.62 Parties wishing to withdraw may do so if they decide 
that "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized" their "supreme 
interests".63 However withdrawal will only take effect 12 months after receipt of a notification of 
withdrawal. Furthermore, if that state is, on the expiry of that 12 month period, a party to an armed 
conflict the state remains bound by the Treaty until it ceases to be a party to an armed conflict.64 In 
theory this prevents withdrawal even in case of jeopardy of "supreme interests" if this is for the 
purpose of using nuclear weapons in an existing armed conflict. 
IV CONTRASTS BETWEEN THE TWO FIELDS 
A Support for an International Prohibition 
The development of an international agreement prohibiting chemical weapons had the support of 
the United States and the Soviet Union from the late 1960s. At that time both possessed chemical 
weapons65 and at the time of their accession to the CWC in 1997, both declared that they continued 
to possess chemical weapons.66 Bilateral efforts between the United States and the Soviet Union to 
reach an agreement prohibiting chemical weapons progressed alongside multilateral efforts. 
Multilateral negotiations intensified after 1968, when chemical weapons disarmament became an 
active issue for consideration by the Geneva disarmament conference.  
The efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union led to a number of agreements which 
facilitated the establishment of the CWC67 and culminated in an important agreement in 1990 
  
62  Article 16. 
63  Article 17(1). Parties to the NPT can withdraw from that Treaty on an identical basis: see NPT, above n 39, 
art X(1). 
64  TPNW, above n 47, art 17(1). 
65  See JP Robinson "The Negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Historical Overview" in 
Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas (eds) The New Chemical Weapons Convention – 
Implementation and Prospects (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998) 22; and US–USSR Joint 
Communiqué at the end of US official visit to the USSR in May 1972 (30 May 1972): "The USA and USSR 
will continue their efforts to reach an international agreement regarding chemical weapons." 
66  As at 20 November 1998, three States Parties had made declarations of current holdings of chemical weapons: 
India, the United States and an unnamed "one other": OPCW Report of the Organisation on the 
Implementation of the Convention (C-III/3, 20 November 1998) at [5.20]. As at 2 July 1999, Russia had also 
made a declaration of current holdings of chemical weapons: OPCW Report of the Organisation on the 
Implementation of the Convention (C-IV/5, 2 July 1999) at [4]. Other Parties that have declared the possession 
of chemical weapons (whether functional or abandoned) include Albania, India, Libya, Russia, Syria, China 
and Japan: Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction in 2015 (C-
21/4, 30 November 2016) at [1.2]. Iraq, Libya, Russia, Syria and the United States still have declared chemical 
weapons: at [1.7].  
67  OPCW "History: Looking back helps us look forward" <www.opcw.org>. 
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following negotiations in Washington. In that 1990 agreement the United States and the Soviet Union 
set out their determination to:68  
… make every effort to conclude and to bring into force at the earliest date a convention providing for a 
global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their 
destruction.  
They also agreed to destroy the bulk of their chemical weapon stockpiles by the end of 1992. Also in 
1992, the General Assembly resolution commending the CWC for signature was adopted without a 
vote, demonstrating the consensus reached in relation to the Convention text.69 Within two days of 
the CWC opening for signature in January 1993, 130 States had become signatories.70 By the end of 
1997 (the year the CWC came into force) there were 105 States Parties to the CWC71 and there has 
now been near-universal accession.72  
By way of contrast the 2017 prohibition of the possession and use of nuclear weapons in all 
circumstances did not receive the support of any State that possesses nuclear weapons. The United 
States, France and the United Kingdom announced that they do not intend to ever become a party to 
the TPNW.73 Russia, which did not attend the vote on the TPNW in the General Assembly, has stated 
that the Treaty will not change the "reality in the field of strategic stability that mandates us to exercise 
utmost caution and responsibility with our evaluations of the future of nuclear disarmament".74 All of 
the States that possess nuclear weapons, and all of their strategic military allies, either failed to attend 
  
68  Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the 
Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics–United States 
(1 June 1990). 
69  GA Res 47/39, above n 16. 
70  OPCW Technical Secretariat Background paper on universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (RC-1/S/5, 25 April 2003) at [7]. 
71  OPCW Report of the Organisation on the Implementation of the Convention, above n 66, at [4.1]. 
72  Israel has signed but not ratified the Convention. Egypt, North Korea and South Sudan have neither signed 
nor ratified it. Palestine has also not ratified the CWC. See International Committee of the Red Cross 
"Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention: statement by the ICRC, 2016" (30 
November 2016).  
73  "Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United 
Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons" (7 July 2017) [France, 
United Kingdom and United States Joint Press Statement]. 
74  Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations "Russian Mission's comments on the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" (27 September 2017).  
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the vote on the TPNW or voted against the Treaty. Of the 29 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Member States, 28 did not attend; the Netherlands attended but voted against.75  
B Condemnation of Use and Possession 
No state defends the use or possession of chemical weapons, including for deterrent purposes.76 
The 193 Parties to the CWC have undertaken not to use or possess chemical weapons in any 
circumstance and States Parties have further committed to a fixed timeline towards the destruction of 
any chemical weapons under their control.77 Three of the four States that have not ratified the 
Convention have condemned the use and possession of chemical weapons through other means: 
Egypt, Israel and North Korea are parties to the Geneva Protocol on Poisonous Gases and have also 
officially denied production and possession of chemical weapons.78 In addition, Egypt supported the 
Security Council's recent attempt to pass a resolution condemning a perceived failure on behalf of 
Syria to cooperate with OPCW inspectors.79 While the quasi-universal accession to the CWC was 
achieved over 20 years80 some States that have recently acceded had previously condemned the use 
and possession of chemical weapons.81 Moreover the OPCW has identified "administrative or 
bureaucratic" reasons, other than disagreement with the obligations enshrined in the CWC, why some 
States took years to ratify the CWC.82  
  
75  "United Nations conference to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons: Second 
session" (record of voting, 7 July 2017).  
76  See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Handbook on International Customary Humanitarian 
Law (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009) at 263. 
77  CWC, above n 8, Annex on Implementation and Verification, pt IV(A) at [17]. 
78  In relation to Israel, see International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) at 261 and 1697. The ICRC has identified 
relevant statements by Israel in 1987, 1991, 1995 and 1997. At the 17th session of the OPCW in 2012 Israel 
stated that "it attaches great importance to the CWC and supports its goals". In relation to Egypt, see at 1689–
1690. The ICRC has identified relevant statements from 1988 and 1990. In relation to North Korea, see at 261 
and 1700. The ICRC noted relevant statements in 1989 and 1995. However the Midterm report of the Panel 
of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) (5 September 2017) at [28], did note that North 
Korea is suspected of shipping prohibited chemical weapons to Syria. 
79  Security Council 7922nd meeting (PM) UN Doc S/PV.7922 (12 April 2017). 
80  On 31 July 1997 there were 95 Parties; three States had acceded to the CWC but it not yet entered into force 
for them and a further 69 had signed but not ratified the Convention: OPCW Technical Secretariat Status of 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on their Destruction (S/6/97, 4 August 1997).  
81  For example, Myanmar acceded to the CWC in 2015. It explained the late accession by reference to "domestic 
circumstances". See U Wunna Maung Lwin, Union Minister for Foreign Affairs "Myanmar: Statement at the 
79th session of the Executive Council of the OPCW" (9 July 2015) at [10]. 
82  In 2003 the OPCW said that the 45 States that remained non-parties had "administrative or bureaucratic" 
reasons, such as a lack of financial and human resources to undertake the parliamentary or other legislative 
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Several States continue to defend the legality of the possession of nuclear weapons, especially 
through the maintenance of policies of nuclear deterrence.83 The United Kingdom, the United States 
and France demonstrated their adherence to a policy of nuclear deterrence in their response to the 
TPNW by stating that:84 
Accession to the ban treaty is incompatible with the policy of nuclear deterrence, which has been essential 
to keeping the peace in Europe and North Asia for over 70 years.  
The Parties to the NPT, which by 1992 included all the nuclear-weapon States as defined by that 
Treaty,85 undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament and a treaty on 
"general and complete disarmament".86 However, States Parties to the NPT made no specific 
commitment in terms of a timeline for disarmament. All of the nuclear-weapon States (again as 
defined in the NPT) except China,87 maintain their right to first use of nuclear weapons.88 The United 
  
actions necessary to adopt and implement the Convention. The OPCW also noted "other pressing issues of 
critical importance" for these States to attend to, such as AIDS, desertification, conflict and poverty: OPCW 
Technical Secretariat, above n 70, at [22]. 
83  See United States Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review (February 2018) at VI: "US nuclear 
capabilities make essential contributions to the deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. The 
deterrence effects they provide are unique and essential to preventing adversary nuclear attacks, which is the 
highest priority of the United States." See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization "North Atlantic Council 
Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" (20 September 2017): "The fundamental 
purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Allies' 
goal is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and to contribute to the indivisible 
security of the Alliance. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance." See United 
Kingdom Ministry of Defence "The UK's nuclear deterrent: what you need to know" (policy paper, 19 
February 2018) <www.gov.uk>: "since 1969, the Royal Navy has delivered the nuclear deterrent under 
Operation Relentless … our retention of an independent centre of nuclear decision making makes clear to any 
adversary that the costs of an attack on UK vital interests will outweigh any benefits".   
84  France, United Kingdom and United States Joint Press Statement, above n 73. 
85  NPT, above n 39, art IX(3): for the purposes of the NPT "a nuclear-weapon State is one which has 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967", 
namely China, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France. 
86  Article VI. 
87  China claims that it has maintained its no-first-use policy ever since 1964 "on the day China conducted its 
first nuclear test": Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People's 
Republic of China: Report submitted by China UN Doc NPT/CONF.2015/32 (27 April 2015) at [7]. See also 
Xinhua "China reiterates non-first-use principle of nuclear weapons" (18 February 2018) 
<www.xinhuanet.com>. 
88  The United Kingdom's stance is unclear; however first use of a nuclear weapon is not ruled out in its definition 
of "modern deterrence": United Kingdom Cabinet Office National Security Capability Review (March 2018) 
at 11. See also Rob Merrick "Theresa May would fire UK's nuclear weapons as a 'first strike', says Defence 
Secretary Michael Fallon" The Independent (online ed, United Kingdom, 24 April 2017). France's stance is 
also unclear and does not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons: see French Senate La nécessaire 
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States maintains this policy expressly: in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review it explained that it "has 
never adopted a 'no first use' policy and, given the contemporary threat environment, such a policy is 
not justified today".89 The United States further articulated its declaratory policy regarding the 
potential employment of nuclear weapons to include that it "would only consider the employment of 
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances [and these] could include significant non-nuclear strategic 
attacks".90 Similarly Russia's 2014 military doctrine reserves:91 
… the right to use nuclear weapons … in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the 
use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.  
In responding to the United States' 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Russia stated that its military 
doctrine limited the use of nuclear weapons more strictly than that of the United States, which did not 
limit their use to specific "military scenarios".92 
C Belligerent Reprisals 
Very few states maintain the right to use chemical weapons by way of belligerent reprisals and 
none appear to advocate this openly. All Parties to the CWC have now undertaken not to use chemical 
weapons in any circumstance. Of the four States that are not parties to the Convention, three (Egypt, 
Israel and North Korea) are parties to the Geneva Protocol on Poisonous Gases and therefore have 
undertaken never to use asphyxiating or poisonous gases, or bacteriological methods of warfare.93 
However Israel and North Korea remain outliers given their implicit maintenance of a right of 
belligerent reprisal involving the use of chemical weapons. This purported right of belligerent reprisal 
is evidenced by their reservations to the Geneva Protocol. These reservations are to the effect that 
they reserve the right to retaliate with chemical weapons should another state use them first.  
  
modernisation de la dissuasion nucléaire (28 June 2017); French Senate La dissuasion nucléaire: quel rôle 
pour la défense française aujourd'hui? (24 October 2006); and Pierre Alonso "Dissuasion nucléaire: la France 
bille en têtes" Libération (online ed, France, 7 February 2018). All nuclear weapon States, except China, 
abstained from Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States 
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons GA Res 70/25 (2015), which reaffirmed "the urgent need 
to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States 
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". 
89  United States Department of Defense, above n 83, at 22. 
90  At 21. 
91  President of the Russian Federation "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" (press release, 25 
December 2014) at [27], available in English on the website of the Russian Embassy to the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland <https://rusemb.org.uk>. 
92  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation "Comment by the Information and Press 
Department on the new US Nuclear Posture Review" (3 February 2018) <www.mid.ru/en>. 
93  Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, above n 12. 
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Some States that possess nuclear weapons expressly maintain their right to use nuclear weapons 
by way of belligerent reprisals. An example is provided by reservations entered in relation to Protocol 
I of the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba).94 States Parties to the Treaty 
undertake not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess 
or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere.95 Parties to the Protocol 
undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any Party to the Treaty.96 China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have signed Protocol I but the United States 
has not ratified it. Upon ratification in 2001, the United Kingdom made the following Declaration, 
among others: 
… the Government of the United Kingdom will not be bound by their undertaking under Article I of 
Protocol I; 
(i) in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed 
forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or 
sustained by a Party to the Treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State … 
Thus the United Kingdom reserves the right to retaliate with the use of nuclear weapons against an 
attack by a State which is associated or allied with a nuclear-weapon State. 
In its Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International 
Court of Justice expressly declined to decide whether the use of nuclear weapons in the conduct of 
belligerent reprisals could ever be lawful.97 However the Court did survey other international 
instruments in which States possessing nuclear weapons had undertaken not to use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear-weapon States but reserved their right to respond in kind to aggression supported 
by a nuclear-weapon State.98 The Court did observe that armed reprisals in time of peace are 
"considered to be unlawful"99 and that any right of recourse to belligerent reprisals would be governed 
by the principle of proportionality.100 In this regard belligerent reprisals, whether by the use of 
chemical or nuclear weapons, or conventional weapons, would be unlawful unless they were 
  
94  Treaty of Pelindaba, above n 38. 
95  Article 3(a). 
96  Protocol I art 1. 
97  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 35, at 246.  
98  At 246. The Court referred to Protocols and accompanying reservations to the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, above n 38, and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, above n 38. 
Since the Advisory Opinion, the Treaty of Pelindaba, above n 38, and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-
Zone in Central Asia, above n 38, have come into force; they include a similar Protocol. 
99  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 35, at 246.  
100  At 246. 
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proportionate and consistent with the requirements of the United Nations Charter, in particular Article 
51.101 
D Development of Weapons 
The conventional prohibition on the development of chemical weapons has been in force since 
1997 and now applies to 193 States. The conventional prohibition on the development of nuclear 
weapons is not yet in force, but the TPNW has 69 signatory States and 19 States Parties.102 
No state is openly developing new chemical weapons. The OPCW has destroyed 90 per cent of 
the world's declared stockpile of chemical agents and 57.32 per cent of its chemical munitions.103 The 
OPCW's annual reports suggest that parties which have declared chemical weapons are generally 
cooperating with the Organization in the destruction of these weapons and are allowing inspections 
on their territory pursuant to the obligations under the CWC.104 However, the OPCW has reported 
the probable use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2017105 and in the United Kingdom in 2018.106 
  
101  Crawford, above n 2, at 564–565; and Matthias Ruffert "Reprisals" in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
International Law (September 2015) at [10]. 
102  As at 3 October 2018. 
103  69,059 metric tonnes, or 90 per cent, of the world's declared stockpile of 72,304 metric tonnes of chemical 
agent and 4.97 million, or 57.32 per cent, of the 8.67 million chemical munitions and containers covered by 
the CWC have been verifiably destroyed as at 1 July 2017: OPCW "OPCW by the numbers" (1 July 2017) 
<www.opcw.org>. 
104  Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction in 2015 , above n 66. In 
relation to destruction of chemical weapons, see [4] and [1.4]–[1.21]. In relation to inspections see [5] and 
[1.1].  
105  The OPCW's fact-finding mission in Syria concluded that sarin was "very likely used as a chemical weapon 
in the south of Ltamenah on 24 March 2017": OPCW Technical Secretariat Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding 
Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged Incidents in Ltamenah, the Syrian Arab Republic on 24 and 25 March 
2017 (S/1636/2018, 13 June 2018) at [1.8] and that "chlorine was very likely used as a chemical weapon at 
Ltamenah Hospital and the surrounding area on 25 March 2017" at [1.10]. OPCW Progress in the Elimination 
of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme (EC-89/DG.24, 24 September 2018) at [6] stated that progress 
in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme reported the destruction of 27 chemical 
weapons production facilities. 
106  OPCW Technical Secretariat Summary of the Report on Activities Carried out in Support of a Request for 
Technical Assistance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  (S/1671/2018, 4 
September 2018). 
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By comparison States that possess nuclear weapons are maintaining and upgrading their 
arsenals.107 While there has only been limited horizontal nuclear proliferation since 1945,108 the 
vertical proliferation of nuclear technologies within States that possess nuclear weapons has not 
ended. 
E Multilateral or Bilateral Agreements 
The comprehensive prohibition on the use and possession of chemical weapons has been 
incorporated in a multilateral convention, the CWC. However, the support of the United States and 
Russia (and before that, the Soviet Union) for various initiatives linked to the development of the 
conventional prohibition was crucial.109 Such initiatives included United States–Soviet agreement in 
relation to on-site inspections and precursor control, as well as a willingness by the early 1990s to 
commit to a reduction in their own chemical weapons arsenals.110 At the same time the United States 
was able to demonstrate a commitment to the non-use of chemical weapons in armed conflict by 
avoiding their use during the Gulf War. By 1990, in the context of that armed conflict, the United 
States appeared to be acting pursuant to a perceived political and moral imperative against the use of 
chemical weapons.111 
To date, the most concrete nuclear disarmament agreements have been achieved bilaterally rather 
than through multilateral agreement. This is because the United States and Russia possess the 
  
107  Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Working Paper 
submitted by Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition UN Doc NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.18 (2 April 
2014) at [7]. The United Kingdom estimates that the manufacturing of the four Dreadnought submarines 
which will replace its current Vanguard submarines as part of its nuclear deterrence policy will cost £31 billion 
with a contingency of £10 billion. They are to be introduced "from the 2030s". See United Kingdom Ministry 
of Defence "Dreadnought submarine programme: factsheet" (policy paper, 19 February 2018) 
<www.gov.uk>. In relation to the United States, see Congressional Budget Office Projected Costs of US 
Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2026 (February 2017) at 4, which includes costing for "[s]ome modernization plans, 
particularly for a new bomber … ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] modernization and the new cruise 
missile."  
108  Certain States, including South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Sweden, considered or commenced the 
development of nuclear weapons programmes but have officially ceased these, according to the Report of the 
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Australian Government Publishing Services, 
August 1996) at 29. South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Sweden voted in favour of the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. 
109  Robinson, above n 65, at 25. 
110  At 25; and Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to 
Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, above n 68. 
111  Richard M Price The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997) at 149–150. 
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overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons in the world.112 While the NPT included general 
obligations on nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to nuclear disarmament,113 bilateral agreements between the United States and 
Russia have included concrete undertakings to abide by timelines for nuclear disarmament. For 
example, pursuant to the New START,114 which entered into force in February 2011, the United 
States and Russia must meet maximum arsenal targets by February 2018. The targets are specific.115 
However in response to Russia's perceived uncertainty as to the United States' commitment to the 
New START116 as well as concern over horizontal nuclear proliferation, Russia has suggested that 
nuclear disarmament agreements take place in future in a multilateral setting. In a statement in 
response to the TPNW in September 2017, the Russian Mission to the United Nations said:117 
Russia cannot move any further in the reduction of its nuclear weapons based only on bilateral agreements 
with the US (not to mention that the position of the Administration of President D. Trump on the New 
START or the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty remains uncertain). We have de facto 
reached the line after which relevant hypothetical negotiations should be held in a multilateral setting. We 
cannot continue to ignore the potential of all other nuclear weapon states any longer. 
This statement is at odds with its previous stance on the issue. Indeed Russia (as well as every 
other nuclear-weapon State, as defined in the NPT) voted against the General Assembly's 2015 
resolution which established the Open-Ended Working Group tasked with progressing multilateral 
nuclear disarmament negotiations.118 Russia (as well as the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France) also voted against a resolution during the same General Assembly session which reaffirmed 
"the continued importance and relevance of multilateral disarmament machinery as mandated by the 
  
112  The Federation of American Scientists estimated the global possession of nuclear warheads in 2017 as 
follows: Russia, 7,000; the United States, 6,800; France, 300; China, 270; the United Kingdom, 215; Pakistan, 
120–130; India, 110–120; Israel, 80; North Korea, less than 10: cited in International Campaign to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons "Nuclear arsenals" <www.icanw.org>.  
113  NPT, above n 39, art VI. 
114  New START, above n 46. 
115  For example, a limit of 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each such heavy bomber is counted 
as one warhead toward this limit): United States Department of State "New START" <www.state.gov>. 
116  According to United States State Department, Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert "Conclusion of UN 
Negotiations on a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons" (press release, 7 July 2017), the United States "remain[s] 
on track to meet the central limits of the New START Treaty when they take effect in February 2018, which 
will cap US and Russian nuclear forces at their lowest levels since the 1950s". 
117  Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, above n 74.  
118  GA Res 70/33, above n 48, emphasised "the importance of addressing issues related to nuclear weapons in a 
comprehensive, inclusive, interactive and constructive manner, for the advancement of multilateral nuclear 
disarmament negotiations". 
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General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament" and endorsed "the wide support 
expressed at the high-level meeting for a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons".119 
F Whether the Prohibition on Use is a Customary Prohibition 
There is support for the view that the prohibition on the use in any circumstance of chemical 
weapons is part of customary international law.120 It is generally agreed that the Hague Regulations 
of 1907 (including the prohibition on poisoned weapons) embody rules of customary international 
law.121 Proponents of a customary prohibition on the use and possession of chemical weapons rely 
on the uniformity of state practice with regards to the condemnation of the use of chemical weapons: 
apart from the near-universal ratification of the CWC, there is the long history of attempts to prohibit 
chemical weapons in treaty form, and the regularity with which states and international organisations 
refer to an international norm against chemical weapons. There appears to be growing support for a 
customary prohibition of reprisals using chemical weapons and, almost as a corollary, a customary 
prohibition on their possession.  
One important reason for the success of the CWC is because the prohibition on chemical weapons 
had a long history which predated that Convention and enabled the customary prohibition on chemical 
weapons to emerge. The "genealogy of the ban"122 on chemical weapons stretches back through 
centuries as a ban on poison in warfare but had a more recent embodiment in the form of the 1899 
Hague Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases.123 This history, and The Hague Declaration, 
provided the "political space" for the eventual total ban on chemical weapons incorporated in the 
CWC.124 
  
119  Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament GA Res 69/58 
(2014). 
120  See for example Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above n 76, at rule 74; the United Kingdom's statement that 
the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons is customary in "Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK 
government legal position" (policy paper, 29 August 2013) <www.gov.uk> at [2]; and Report of the United 
Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on 
the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013: Note by the 
Secretary-General UN Doc A/67/997 (16 September 2013) at [4]. 
121  According to the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal Trial of the Major War Criminals, 14 November 
1945-1 October 1946 (Nuremberg, 1947) vol 1 at 54; and the Secretary-General of the United Nations Report 
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) UN Doc 
S/25704 (3 May 1993); both cited in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 35, at 258. 
122  Price, above n 111, at 15. 
123  Hague Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases (adopted 29 July 1899, entered into force 4 September 
1900). 
124  Price, above n 111, at 167. See also GA Res 47/39, above n 16, preamble: "Recalling the long-standing 
determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, 
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In relation to nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice concluded in 1996 that customary 
international law did not contain a comprehensive and universal prohibition on their use.125 The Court 
considered whether existing principles and rules of humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons and 
whether they might lead to a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons in every circumstance.126 It 
found that such principles and rules of humanitarian law do apply to nuclear weapons and that their 
use – given the "unique characteristics" of nuclear weapons – "seems scarcely reconcilable" with those 
rules.127 However the Court determined that it was not possible to find that the use of nuclear weapons 
would necessarily be "at variance" with the laws applicable in armed conflict in every 
circumstance.128  
The Court identified an "increasing concern in the international community" in relation to nuclear 
weapons.129 However it found that "members of the international community were profoundly 
divided" on whether the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 constituted an expression of an opinio 
juris that their use was unlawful.130 In particular a number of States maintained before the Court that 
they had always reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in self-defence and maintained their support 
for the practice of deterrence.131 The Court also noted States that possess nuclear weapons have 
registered their objection to the nascent opinio juris that every possession or use of nuclear weapons 
is unlawful by refusing to support General Assembly resolutions which condemn the use of nuclear 
weapons.132 The Court ultimately found that there was a "nascent" opinio juris to the effect that the 
use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances was unlawful but that it was in tension with "strong 
adherence to the practice of deterrence".133  
  
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, as well as the continuing support 
for measures to uphold the authority of the [Geneva Protocol]." 
125  Price, above n 111, at 266. The Court also found that in 1996 conventional international law lacked this 
comprehensive prohibition. 
126  At 261. 
127  At 262. 
128  At 263. 
129  At 253. This concern was manifested for example through General Assembly resolutions. 
130  At 254. 
131  At 266. 
132  Starting with Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons GA Res 1653 
(1961). See the discussion of these resolutions in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 
35, at 254. 
133  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 35, at 255. 
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In response to the TPNW, the United Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan and India – all States 
that possess nuclear weapons – have issued statements to the effect that they consider that the Treaty 
does not contribute to the development of customary international law.134  
V WHAT LESSONS ARE TO BE LEARNT AS TO THE PROBLEM 
OF CHANGE? 
To summarise, there are striking differences between the regulatory history of the two kinds of 
weapon in our time. The "difference of views with regard to the legal status" of nuclear weapons 
identified by the International Court in 1996 has persisted.135 The prohibition in the TPNW on the 
use and possession of nuclear weapons in all circumstances has not been supported by any of the 
States that possess nuclear weapons and the formation of a customary prohibition on the possession 
and use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances is hindered by the presence of persistent objectors.136 
By contrast a comprehensive prohibition on the use and possession of chemical weapons embodied 
in the CWC emerged despite initial resistance from some States.137 Contrasting attempts to outlaw 
chemical weapons with attempts to outlaw nuclear weapons provides some lessons for future efforts 
for the suppression of the possession and use of nuclear weapons. What lessons are to be learnt from 
this? 
A Multilateral Verification and Implementing Treaty Body 
The first lesson is organisational. A trusted multilateral verification regime is key to achieving 
comprehensive nuclear disarmament.138 A major breakthrough that helped lead to the conclusion of 
the CWC was the Soviet Union's acceptance in August 1987 of an intrusive verification regime as 
part of a treaty prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.139 The United States' acceptance two years 
  
134  See France, United Kingdom and United States Joint Press Statement, above n 73; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Pakistan "Press Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" (7 August 2017); and 
Ministry of External Affairs of India "Response by the Official Spokesperson to a media query regarding 
India's view on the Treaty to ban nuclear weapons" (18 July 2017). 
135  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 35, at 263. 
136  The International Law Commission in its Third report, above n 7, at 66, confirmed that a state "may deny that 
an emerging rule has become a rule of customary international law, or object to the applicability of the rule 
to itself, or do both". In this case it is the denial of the emergence of a new rule that is relevant.  
137  For example at the 1925 League of Nations Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms 
and Ammunition and in Implements of War at Geneva, the Brazilian representative indicated that in his view 
a prohibition on the trade of "gas weapons" would be unfair to States that did not produce them, especially 
because chemical weapons were an effective means of defence for weak countries: J Goldblat The Problem 
of chemical and biological weapons (Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971) vol 4 at 59 as cited in Jefferson, 
above n 9, at 658. 
138  Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, above n 108, at 13. 
139  OPCW, above n 67. 
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later that a verification regime for chemical weapons could be created that would satisfy their concerns 
about the proliferation of chemical weapons also bolstered efforts to finalise the CWC.140   
The potential for one state to develop nuclear weapons (clandestinely or otherwise) at the same 
time as other states agree multilaterally to disarm is a concern of States that possess nuclear weapons. 
It is used as an explanation for their retention of nuclear weapons.141 In particular, North Korea is 
seen as a threat.142 North Korea did not attend the vote at which the TPNW was adopted: in this it 
was not alone. In 2003 North Korea officially maintained that it had "no intention to produce nuclear 
weapons" and that its "nuclear activities" were confined "only to peaceful purposes";143 however the 
present position seems to be very different. It is suspected of having recently tested nuclear weapons 
and of accelerating its nuclear weapons programme.144 North Korea is the only state to have 
announced the conduct of nuclear weapon tests since 1998, when India and Pakistan conducted two 
tests each.145 Finally, North Korea purported unilaterally to withdraw from the NPT in 2003.146 The 
ideal verification regime would operate independently from state consent. One hundred and sixty-
eight States are members of the IAEA,147 which is responsible for international activities concerned 
with the peaceful use of nuclear energy.148 One of the IAEA's functions is to establish and administer 
safeguards to ensure that special fissionable and other materials and equipment are not used to further 
  
140  George Bush, President of the United States "Address to the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly" (New 
York, 25 September 1989): "the knowledge we've gained from our recent arms control experience and our 
accelerating research in this area makes me believe that we can achieve the level of verification that gives us 
confidence to go forward with the ban". See also Robinson, above n 65, at 27. 
141  See France, United Kingdom and United States Joint Press Statement, above n 73: "This treaty offers no 
solution to the grave threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program, nor does it address other security 
challenges that make nuclear deterrence necessary." 
142  France, United Kingdom and United States Joint Press Statement, above n 73. 
143  "Official Statement of the Government of the DPR of Korea: Withdraw[al] of the Nuclear Non Proliferation 
Treaty" (10 January 2003). 
144  Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-test-ban Treaty Organization "CTBTO Executive 
Secretary Lassina Zerbo on the Unusual Seismic Event Detected in the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea" (press release, 3 September 2017). 
145  Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-test-ban Treaty Organization "World Overview" 
<www.ctbto.org>. 
146  According to the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs online treaty database: "On 10 January 2003, 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its withdrawal from the Treaty in a public 
statement. States parties to the Treaty continue to express divergent views regarding the status of the DPRK 
under the NPT." 
147  Included in that figure are the following States whose membership has been approved by the IAEA General 
Conference but will only take effect once the necessary legal instruments have been deposited with the IAEA: 
Cabo Verde, Comoros, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, The Gambia and Tonga. 
148  IAEA Medium Term Strategy 2018–2023 at 1. 
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any military purpose and to apply safeguards to any of state's activities in the field of atomic energy.149 
However a state must consent to IAEA membership and must conclude Safeguard Agreements with 
the organisation.150 The example of North Korea demonstrates the limitations of IAEA verification. 
In 1994 North Korea withdrew its membership of the IAEA151 and took the view that this meant that 
it was no longer obliged to allow IAEA inspectors to carry out their work under its Safeguards 
Agreement.152 It expelled inspectors on 27 December 2002,153 leaving nuclear material in North 
Korea without any monitoring by the IAEA.154 While Kim Jong-un announced his commitment "to 
work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" in June 2018 in the context of 
bilateral negotiation with the United States,155 the IAEA maintained in September 2018 that "[t]he 
further development of the DPRK's nuclear programme … and related statements by the DPRK, are 
a cause for grave concern."156 
The foundations for a robust verification regime already exist. The Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has built up a verification regime in 
preparation for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The 
Organization's monitoring system detected the most recent purported nuclear test by North Korea on 
3 September 2017 and had previously detected tests in 2006.157 A proper trusted verification regime 
reduces the likelihood that so-called "rogue" states can develop a nuclear weapons capability in breach 
  
149  Statute of the IAEA 276 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 23 October 1956, entered into force 29 July 1957), 
art III(A)(5). 
150  "Further, the verification required under IAEA safeguards agreements depends primarily on the facilities 
which each State party to the NPT identifies on its own territory": United Nations Disarmament: Responding 
to New Realities in Disarmament – Excerpts from the panel discussions at the Disarmament Week Symposium 
held at the United Nations in New York, 26-27 October 1993 (United Nations, New York, 1994) at 9. 
151  It had joined the IAEA in 1974. IAEA "Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards" <www.iaea.org>. In the 
IAEA's view the Safeguards Agreement remained binding and in force despite the withdrawal. 
152  Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (signed 30 January 1992, entered into force 10 April 1992). 
153  IAEA, above n 148.  
154  IAEA "IAEA Board Meets 6 January to Consider Next Steps on DPRK Issue" (3 January 2003) 
<www.iaea.org>. 
155  "Joint Statement of President Donald J Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (12 June 2018). 
156  IAEA Director General "Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors" (September 2018). 
157  Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-test-ban Treaty Organization "DPRK Sept 2017 
Unusual Seismic Event" <www.ctbto.org>; and Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-
test-ban Treaty Organization "The CTBT Verification Regime put to the test – the event in the DPRK on 9 
October 2006" <www.ctbto.org>. 
470 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
of official commitments to other states and without the knowledge of others. A related organisational 
consideration is that a multilateral treaty body is required to implement and verify the existing 
obligations on nuclear-weapon States, as defined in the NPT, to achieve nuclear disarmament in all 
its aspects.158 The CWC created the OPCW, which ensures the implementation of the convention and 
verification of States Parties' obligations.159 The OPCW is constituted by an Executive Council, the 
Conference of State Parties and the Secretariat whose respective roles are laid down in the CWC.160 
Among other things the Conference of State Parties adopts the programme of the OPCW and makes 
"decisions on any questions, matters or issues" related to the CWC.161 A party to the CWC cannot be 
deprived of OPCW membership.162 
There is no parallel organisation in the field of nuclear disarmament. The NPT did not create a 
treaty body to oversee the implementation of its "mutually reinforcing objectives" of horizontal non-
proliferation and nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon States.163 While every five years, parties 
to the NPT meet to review its implementation, there is no treaty body with a specific mandate to 
facilitate good faith negotiations towards nuclear disarmament or to develop effective measures 
towards disarmament with a view to implementing Article VI of the NPT. The NPT's non-
proliferation objective has been facilitated through IAEA assistance, including Safeguard 
Agreements. The TPNW will also rely on IAEA Safeguard Agreements for compliance verification 
once it enters into force.164 The IAEA was originally also mandated to apply safeguards to "any 
bilateral or multilateral arrangement"165 and conduct its activities in conformity with policies of the 
United Nations "furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide".166 However IAEA 
safeguards have not previously been applied to nuclear disarmament activities because of resistance 
by some States.167 
  
158  Working Paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, above n 107, at [26(vii)]. The 
International Court of Justice identified this existing obligation pursuant to art VI of the NPT: Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 35, at 264.  
159  CWC, above n 8, art VIII. 
160  Article VIII. 
161  Article VIII(B)(19). 
162  Art VIII(A)(2). 
163  Working Paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, above n 107, at [2]. See NPT, 
above n 39, arts I–III and VI. 
164  TPNW, above n 47, art 3. 
165  Statute of the IAEA, above n 149, art III(A)(5). 
166  Article III(B)(1). 
167  Working Paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, above n 107, at [12].  
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B A Staged Approach to Nuclear Disarmament 
Second, there are lessons about appropriate mechanisms for change. A staged approach to nuclear 
disarmament through bilateral agreements (between two States that possess nuclear weapons, and 
between a State that possesses nuclear weapons and a non-nuclear-weapon State) and security 
assurances should be adopted.168 The CWC provides for the elimination from use, and the destruction, 
of an entire category of weapons.169 However the recent attempt to outlaw nuclear weapons through 
the TPNW, providing for the comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons, has not received the 
support of States that possess nuclear weapons.  
The argument for a staged approach is supported by earlier attempts to outlaw the use of nuclear 
weapons, which have demonstrated that staged nuclear disarmament is more acceptable to States that 
possess nuclear weapons. These States have shown their willingness to agree not to use nuclear 
weapons in particular geographical areas,170 within nuclear-free-zones171 or against certain other 
states or groups of states.172 They have also committed not to use nuclear weapons in certain 
situations.173 Amongst the States that possess nuclear weapons, there are calls for the broadening of 
circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons is prohibited by treaty: China seeks the elaboration 
  
168  This approach was recommended in the Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons, above n 108. 
169  According to the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, the CWC is the first disarmament agreement 
negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons 
of mass destruction under universally applied international control. 
170  For example, nuclear explosions are prohibited in the Antarctic pursuant to art V of The Antarctic Treaty, 
above n 38. All nuclear-weapon States are parties to the Treaty except for Pakistan and Israel. 
171  See for example Treaty of Pelindaba, above n 38, protocol I art 1. The United States supports the establishment 
of nuclear-free-zones: Christopher Buck, Deputy Chief of Mission, Delegation to the Conference on 
Disarmament Permanent Mission "Statement to the Third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference" (United Nations, New York, 2 May 2014): "The 
United States also supports well-crafted nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) that are vigorously enforced 
and developed in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission." 
172  For example China's negative assurance: "Statement by HE Ambassador Hu Xiaodi on Security Assurances 
for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at the Main Committee I of the 2005 NPT Review Conference" (New York, 
24 May 2005) that "China has all along committed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at no time or 
under no circumstances, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and 
nuclear-weapon-free zones, thus providing unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon 
states."  
173  "Statement by HE Ambassador Hu Xiaodi", above n 172. 
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of a treaty on the mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons174 and Russia has expressed its support for 
the bringing into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.175 
Incremental progress towards nuclear disarmament has occurred through bilateral agreements 
between States that possess nuclear weapons (sometimes with fixed timelines for disarmament) rather 
than multilateral treaties. A telling example is that in the decade to September 2000, during which 
time the United States and the Soviet Union (then Russia) engaged in successive agreements in 
relation to strategic weapons, the number of United States deployed strategic nuclear weapons reduced 
by approximately half.176 The preference shown by States that possess nuclear weapons for bilateral 
agreements as a means of committing to specific disarmament targets is linked to security concerns. 
This is evidenced by the fact that these States appear more likely to commit to tangible disarmament 
goals when they are matched by other States that possess nuclear weapons.177 Staged disarmament 
recognises the security concerns of nuclear-weapon States and ensures they are confident with and 
committed to the next stage in the process of disarmament.178  
Nuclear disarmament is more likely to be successful if it is not conditional on horizontal non-
proliferation. The two objectives – disarmament and non-proliferation – are linked in the NPT. The 
United States justifies its possession of nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes by its position that its 
own possession of nuclear weapons, coupled with assurances provided to its allies, enables other states 
to "eschew possession of nuclear weapons", thereby encouraging non-proliferation.179 Concern by 
States that possess nuclear weapons that non-nuclear-weapon States are developing nuclear weapons 
has limited their compliance with their NPT commitments.180 Once horizontal proliferation is 
  
174  "Statement by HE Mr Cheng Jingye Head of the Chinese Delegation to the First Session of the Preparatory 
Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons" (Vienna, 30 April 2012) at 4: "The nuclear-weapon states should unequivocally undertake not to 
be the first to use nuclear weapons and negotiate and conclude the Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear 
Weapons." 
175  Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister "Statement at the Conference on Disarmament" (Geneva, 28 
February 2018). 
176  Nina Tannenwald The Nuclear Taboo (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) at 330. 
177  For example, the series of United States–Russian bilateral disarmament treaties since 1994: START I, above 
n 46; START II, above n 46; SORT, above n 46; and New START, above n 46. See also the India–Pakistan 
Lahore Declaration (21 February 1999). However, there are examples of unilateral nuclear disarmament, 
notably South Africa: Disarmament: Responding to New Realities in Disarmament, above n 50, at i. 
178  Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, above n 108, at 51. 
179  United States Department of Defense, above n 83, at VIII.  
180  In particular their commitments pursuant to art VI. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization "The Nuclear 
Weapons Ban Treaty: reasons for skepticism" (19 May 2017) <www.nato.int> [NATO], which notes the 
"grave threat posed by North Korea's nuclear programme", concluding that "the treaty fails to take into account 
these urgent security challenges". 
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contained, the logic of each state maintaining a nuclear arsenal (for deterrence or retaliation) 
disappears.181 Conversely as long as nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remain linked the 
retention of nuclear weapons by States that already possess them might lead to attempts by non-
nuclear-weapon States to acquire nuclear weapons.182 This is because the possession of nuclear 
weapons by any state stimulates the desire by other states to acquire them.183 
According to some States that possess nuclear weapons, horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons is key to achieving general nuclear disarmament.184 One hundred and eighty-six non-
nuclear-weapon States have already ratified the NPT, which includes an undertaking by them not to 
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.185 Despite this, States that possess nuclear weapons have 
sought to justify their rejection of the TPNW by pointing to a dangerous security situation, including 
the possession by other states of nuclear weapons.186 States that possess nuclear weapons have also 
in many instances made negative security assurances conditional on nuclear non-proliferation in the 
state receiving the security assurance.187 Wide ratification of and compliance with the TPNW could 
disaggregate nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament by removing concerns over 
horizontal non-proliferation as an obstacle to disarmament.  
On a normative level, the enactment of an international legal prohibition on the possession and 
use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances contributes to placing these actions outside the ambit of 
"responsible statehood".188 The corollary is that the TPNW could create a new social standard in 
  
181  Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, above n 108, at 24: "The only 
military utility that remains for nuclear weapons is in deterring their use by others. That utility implies the 
continued existence of nuclear weapons. It would disappear if nuclear weapons were eliminated." 
182  Working Paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, above n 107, at [34]. 
183  Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, above n 108, at 18. 
184  See France, United Kingdom and United States Joint Press Statement, above n 73: "We reiterate in this regard 
our continued commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and reaffirm 
our determination to safeguard and further promote its authority, universality and effectiveness." 
185  NPT, above n 39, art II. North Korea acceded to the NPT on 12 December 1985 but announced its withdrawal 
from the NPT on 10 January 2003.  
186  For example, Nikki Haley, United States United Nations envoy, stating that: "There is nothing I want more 
for my family than a world with no nuclear weapons. But we have to be realistic." See also NATO, above n 
180. 
187  For example France's declaration to Protocol I of the Treaty of Pelindaba, above n 38: France's "assurances 
do not apply to States which are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". In 
relation to the United States negative security assurance, see Steven Pifer and others US Nuclear and Extended 
Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges (The Brookings Institution, Arms Control Series Paper 3, May 
2010) at 16. 
188  Adam Bower Norms Without the Great Powers (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) at 32. 
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terms of a total prohibition on the use and possession of nuclear weapons, by which states will 
conform in order to achieve the status of a "civilised" state.189 
Bilateral or limited multi-party agreements can also be an effective way of curtailing horizontal 
nuclear proliferation.190 Such agreements also foster a security environment which might be 
perceived as favourable to nuclear disarmament by States that possess nuclear-weapons. The Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) can be seen as an example of both the role of multi-party 
agreements in the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation, but also their limitations in terms of 
progressing nuclear disarmament.191 In relation to the latter point, the United States withdrew from 
the plan in May 2018, citing security concerns in relation to Iran's nuclear ambitions.192 As to the 
former, Iran, a state which the Security Council had previously found in breach of its IAEA 
obligations193 has committed to specific non-proliferation obligations as contained in the JCPOA. 
Iran's commitment to the terms of the JCPOA, and to its IAEA nuclear-related obligations, continue 
despite the United States withdrawal.194 
States that possess nuclear weapons argue that nuclear disarmament will come from a commitment 
to the NPT rather than the new TPNW prohibition.195 In this regard, when the United States withdrew 
from the JCPOA it sought to justify its action, in part, by Iran's past violation of the NPT as evidence 
that the JCPOA's verification mechanism was inadequate.196  
The problem remains that, while the NPT contains a clear prohibition on the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by new States,197 it contains no specific temporal or logistical obligations for disarmament. 
  
189  At 32, citing Tannenwald, above n 176, at 433 and 347. 
190  See for example the Iran–United States and European Union deal, as to which see International Crisis Group 
Implementing the Iran Nuclear Deal: A Status Report (Middle East Report No 173, 16 January 2017); and 
"The Iran nuclear accord: Making the world a bit safer" The Economist (online ed, United States, 18 July 
2015). 
191  Iran, China, France, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (14 July 2015). 
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Action to Counter Iran's Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon" (8 May 2018). 
193  SC Res 1929 (2010) at [1].  
194  "Statement from the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" (6 July 2018). 
195  See French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs "Adoption of a treaty banning nuclear weapons" (press 
release, 7 July 2017): "Nuclear disarmament is not achieved by decree, it must be built. France, for its part, 
remains determined to implement the next concrete stages in nuclear disarmament, in accordance with its 
commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." 
196  United States Presidential Memorandum, above n 192. 
197  NPT, above n 39, art II. 
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This enables nuclear-weapon States, as defined in the NPT, to slow their nuclear disarmament in 
response to their perceived security environment. Most recently, the United States reiterated its 
commitment to the NPT in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review but added that "the current environment 
makes further progress toward nuclear arms reductions in the near term extremely challenging".198 
C Lessons in Realpolitik 
Finally, there are lessons in realpolitik. Another breakthrough that led to the conclusion of the 
CWC was the United States' willingness to renounce in 1992 the option of retaliation in kind with 
chemical weapons. The adoption of the TPNW has identified the position of each state in relation to 
their willingness to support the comprehensive prohibition on the use and possession of nuclear 
weapons. Seven of the nine States that possess nuclear weapons officially support comprehensive 
nuclear disarmament199 and many of their strategic military allies do so as well.200 However, States 
that possess nuclear weapons point to the existence of a security situation that they say does not allow 
for complete nuclear disarmament.201 They maintain long-held deterrence policies and reserve the 
right to lawfully use nuclear weapons in some circumstances. In particular, States that possess nuclear 
weapons reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in belligerent reprisals, which is irreconcilable with 
comprehensive nuclear disarmament.202 The progression of nuclear disarmament through 
international agreements needs to take account of these factors.  
To conclude, the International Court recognised in 1996 that the "realistic search" for nuclear 
disarmament "necessitates the co-operation of all States".203 This includes the agreement of States 
  
198  United States Department of Defense, above n 83, at III. 
199  See statements by India: "Statement by Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill, Permanent Representative of India 
to the Conference on Disarmament" (28 March 2017); Pakistan, above n 134; China, above n 87, at [4] and 
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200  See for example Julie Bishop, Australian Foreign Minister "Working towards a nuclear weapons-free world" 
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203  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 35, at 264. 
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that possess nuclear weapons and their strategic allies. The cooperation of these States is so far absent 
in relation to the TPNW. As the Canberra Commission wrote in 1996:204  
The key responsibility lies with the nuclear weapon states … and in particular with the United States and 
Russia. The invigoration of the elimination progress [of nuclear weapons] will depend on decisions which 
they alone can make. 
  
204  Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, above n 108, at 30. 
